Political observers from various backgrounds have labeled the second presidential debate as uninspiring, noting a lack of meaningful dialogue and clear articulation of the candidates’ plans—a situation that could inadvertently discourage public engagement and reduce voter turnout. Despite this, concerns are rising within conservative circles about potential polarization and the risk of post-election “sedition.” This raises the question: if the debates are not motivating voters, why are conservatives and representatives of the supreme leader in Friday prayer sermons worried about polarization or sedition? The answer may lie in central issues like relations with the West, as well as expectations from the Guardian Council to manage candidate selection in a way that avoids repeating past election controversies.
In the Islamic Republic’s political discourse, the terms “sedition” and “polarization” evoke memories of the contentious presidential elections of 2009 and 2013. One election was marred by mass protests over alleged fraud that led to Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s victory and resulted in the house arrest of Green Movement leaders Mehdi Karrubi and Mir-Hosein Musavi, as well as Musavi’s wife Zahra Rahnavard. The other election highlighted the critical need for engagement with the U.S. to alleviate the threats of war and sanctions—a stance contrary to the supreme leader’s guidelines and the ideology of resistance. Both elections intensified the reformist-principlist dichotomy in political discourse, generally benefiting the reformists in public opinion. However, during President Rouhani’s second term, nationwide protests over high prices, corruption, and failed policies—exacerbated by the collapse of the JCPoA—diminished this dichotomy, with protesters chanting, “reformist, principlist, it’s over.”
Since then, the Guardian Council has consistently eliminated prominent reformist candidates in presidential and parliamentary elections, disenfranchising a significant segment of reformist forces to the extent that the camp officially abstained from participating in the recent parliamentary elections. Observers across the political spectrum grew concerned about the radicalization of these forces and their potential opposition to the regime. Although many reformist politicians attributed the rapid decline in participation rates to their exclusion and urged the regime to let them assist, it gradually became clear that the public’s disinterest was more about the perceived futility of elections as the most pressing national issues seemed beyond the president’s control.
Surprisingly, in this year’s special presidential election the Guardian Council allowed a single reformist candidate, Mas’ud Pezeshkian, to run, strategically eliminating other prominent reformist contenders such as Eshaq Jahangiri, Abbas Akhundi, and Mohammad Shar’iatmadari—all associated with the Rouhani administration. The controversial elimination of Ali Larijani, although not unprecedented, could be linked to his strong stance on key issues like the JCPoA, which had started to align with Rouhani’s views before the Guardian Council’s decision to disqualify him. Thus, the final selection of candidates by the Guardian Council left Pezeshkian as the sole reformist but one who has never strongly aligned with staunch reformist politicians or former president Rouhani on critical issues such as the JCPoA and relations with the U.S. In presidential debates, he has consistently expressed his devotion to the supreme leader and appeared unwilling to challenge the principlists, refusing to revive the old reformist-principlist dichotomy or to rekindle discussions on sanctions and relations with the West. However, when Pezeshkian participated in a televised Q&A session with former foreign minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif, the discussion unexpectedly focused on sanctions, the fear of Donald Trump’s potential return, and Iran’s challenges in neutralizing sanctions.
Meanwhile, reports emerged that reformist forces sought endorsements from former Green Movement leaders under house arrest to maximize their support. Whether Pezeshkian was a dark horse who surprised the Guardian Council after his vetting or both “benign” and “radical” reformists around him were pushing him to offer a message of hope to re-energize voters, this new discourse has raised concerns. As Zarif began to gain momentum for the reformist camp accompanying Pezeshkian on a visit to Isfahan, the provincial office in Razavi Khorasan reportedly took action, canceling his next trip to Mashhad. Amid these concerns, conservative outlets have highlighted the perceived “polarization” created by Zarif and the potential return of a third Rouhani administration.
Against this backdrop, an analytic piece in the influential Nour News, affiliated with Ali Shamkhani, discussed the necessity of moving away from the past reformist-principlist dichotomy, suggesting that the Guardian Council’s selection of candidates was an effort to show inclusiveness while ensuring that those selected do not deviate from the supreme leader’s directives or the Nezam’s major policies. This would be a correction for what occurred under Rouhani and his administration. As Nour News reiterated, the election is not a referendum against the Nezam and should not be treated as such to ensure the continued possibility of supra-factional cooperation over the nation’s major issues. Elections allow the winning side to continue or change the “executive” methods of securing national interests within the frameworks defined by the Constitution. If this theory regarding the Guardian Council’s considerations holds true, significant policy changes akin to those seen in the first Rouhani administration are unlikely to occur and the winner will be featured as a moderate figure—not a political party—that is tightly aligned with the Nezam.
